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White Plains

Reflections on
Client Perjury

M

ost experienced prosecutors, judges, and defense
attorneys would probably agree that perjury in the
criminal justice system occurs often.
Although the frequency of perjury
has never empirically been
demonstrated, it is not surprising
that with so much at stake, prosecution and defense witnesses would be
tempted to fabricate testimony to
meet the exigencies of the case.
Detecting and dealing with perjurious testimony, however, is
another matter. Implicated are complex legal and ethical problems for
both prosecutors and defense attorneys.l The judiciary's response to
these problems, moreover, has
largely been formalistic, without
enunciating sufficiently clear standards to guide future behavior.
For example, prosecutorial
tolerance, and even active subornation of perjury, usually is analyzed
objectively for its impact on the
factfinder's evaluation of the
evidence, rather than focusing subjectively on the prosecutor's
willfulness or bad faith. 2 Clearly,
for purposes of remedying prosecutor misconduct in the future,
such a response is wholly unsatisfac30

tory. That issue, however, is a subject for another essay. The present
discussion concerns the extent to
which a criminal defense attorney
legally and ethically may cooperate
with his or her client in concealing
the truth.
Plainly, in protecting his client's
interests, defense counsel's commitment to truth can vary greatly. At
one extreme, of course, are acts
deliberately designed to conceal the
truth, such as secreting evidence,
fabricating defenses, and suborning
perjury. 3 Such conduct can never be

* Adjunct Professor of Law, Pace University.
1 See G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW (1978); J. BURKOFF,
CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS - LAW AND
LIABILITY (1986); B. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (1985).
2 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972).
3 See, e.g., Clutchette v. RUj;ken, 770 F.2d
1469 (9th Cir. 1985); In re January 1976
Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1976); In
re Ryder, 263 F.Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967),
affd, 381 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1967); Thornton
v. United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C. App.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976); In re
Branch, 449 P.2d 174, 74 Cal. Rptr. 238
(1969); In re Rosenberg, 27{j App. Div. 268,
93 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1950).
.
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justified or condoned. At the other
extreme are options which
legitimately permit suppression of
the truth. These include, for instance, advising a client to refuse to
testify or comply with a subpoena
ordering the production of records,
pursuant to a valid claim of
privilege. 4 Between these ethical and
legal extremes, however, are more
nebulous situations, such as "advising" a client of the legal consequences of possessing certain
documents, or suggesting the
availability of "hypothetical"
defenses, knowing full well that the
client will engage in conduct or
tailor his story to mesh with that advice. s Given the adversary system,
in which "winning" can overshadow
the quest for truth,6 extremely complex questions arise: Is a criminal
defense lawyer required to play the
dual roles of loyal "champion" of
his client, and "gatekeeper" of the
temple of justice? Are these roles
really compatible? If so, what are
the rules of the game?
Consider in this connection
perhaps the most difficult question
of all: How far, if ever, can a
criminal defense lawyer cooperate
in his or her client's decision to commit perjury? Courts,7 commentators, g and bar committees9 have
grappled with this question for
years without offering clear or consistent guidelines. Any principled
response, however, must take into
account some very hard questions.
Under what circumstances, for instance, does the lawyer ever really
"know" that his client's proposed
testimony is false? Is it sufficient if
the lawyer simply disbelieves his
client's story, or that of his client's
witnesses?9. Does it make any difference if the attorney learns of the
plan during the trial, as opposed to
prior to the trial? What actions can
the lawyer properly take when he
believes that his client intends to
commit perjury? Is the prevention'
of perjury more important than
loyal and aggressive representation?
Can the lawyer simply remain

silent, and passively permit the perjury to occur? Can he threaten to
impeach his client's testimony?
Withdraw from the case? Report his
client's actions to the judge?
Last Term, in Nix v. Whiteside,lO
the Supreme Court for the first time
addressed several of these questions.
The Court unanimously agreed,
under the facts of the case, that the
lawyer's refusal to assist his client's
plan to commit perjury did not
deprive the defendant of his Sixth
Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel, nor of his
right to testify in his own defense. l1
A majority of the Court essayed the
ethical questions as well, and in
obiter dicta, concluded that "under
no circumstances may a lawyer
either advocate or passively tolerate
a client's giving false testimony."12
The majority went further,
however, and formulated specific
rules of permissible and impermissible attorney behavior.
The facts were uncomplicated.
Whiteside was tried in an Iowa state
court for stabbing to death a friend,
Love, following an argument over
drugs. One of the principal issues
was whether the killing was in selfdefense. During pretrial preparation, Whiteside consistently told his
court-appointed counsel that he had
not actually seen a gun in the
deceased's hand. About a week
before trial, however, he changed
his story, stating that he had seen

4 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
(1976); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547 (1892).
s See ABA MODEL CODE DR
7-102(A)(7)("in his representation of a client,
a lawyer shall not . . . counselor assist his
client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be
illegal or fraudulent"); ABA MODEL RULE
1.2(d)("a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct
with a client and may assist a client to make a
good faith effort to determine the validity,
scope, meaning or application of the law").
The Commentary to MODEL RULE 1.2(d)
states: "There is a critical distinction between
presenting an analysis of legal aspects of
questionable conduct and recommending the
means by which a crime or fraud might be
committed with impunity."
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6 See Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution:
Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? 1963
Wash. U. L. Q. 279, 292.
7 Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986)
(lawyer must withdraw or disclose intended
perjury); Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727
(9th Cir. 1978) (withdrawal request
predicated on client perjury in middle of
bench trial denied client fair trial); United
States ex reI. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115
(3d Cir. 1977) (attorney's disclosure to judge
of client's intended perjury has chilling effect
on effective representation).

8 Rieger, Client Perjury: A Proposed
Resolution of the Constitutional and Ethical
Issues, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 121 (1985); Callan
and David, Professional Responsibility and
the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of
Client Misconduct in an Adversary System,
29 Rutgers L. Rev. 332 (1976); Freedman,
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer; The Three H,.rdest Questions, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1469 (1966).
9 ABA MODEL RULES 1.2(d), 3.3(c); ABA
MODEL CODE, DR 7-102(A)(4), DR
7-102(A)(7); ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 4-7.7 (2d ed. 1980);
AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION CODE, Rule 1.2 (1980). The ATLA
Code contains no specific rule on client perjury since the entire matter is subsumed under
Rule 1.2 relating to strict attorney confidentiality regarding client perjury.
9. A threshold question in considering client
perjury is the extent to which a lawyer must
be convinced that his client intends to commit
perjury. It is rare when the lawyer really
"knows" that his client intends to commit
perjury. See Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988
(1986). Clearly, a lawyer must have a firm
factual basis for believing that his client intends to commit perjury. A hunch, or
speculation, is insufficient to trigger an
ethical duty. See United States ex rei. Wilcox
v, Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cit. 1977).
Under the Model Rules, a lawyer may refuse
to offer evidence that the lawyer "reasonably
believes" is false. Model Rule 3.3(c). Some
commentators recommend a more rigorous
standard of attorney belief. See Rieger, Client
Perjury: A Proposed Resolution of the Constitutional and Ethical Issues, 70 Minn. L.
Rev. 121, 149 (1985) (recommending standard of belief "beyond a reasonable doubt");
ABA Formal Opinion 314 (1965) (lawyer
should disclose client confidences if lawyer is
convinced "beyond a reasonable doubt" that
a crime will be committed).
10 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
11 The Supreme Court has never explicitly
held, but has consistently assumed, that a
criminal defendant has a due process right to
testify in his own behalf. rd, at 993. See Jones
v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983); Brooks v.
Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972); Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).

12 106 S. Ct. at 996. The extent to which a
lawyer may stand mute, and permit his client
to testify in a free narrative fashion, is one of
the most controversial issues relating to client
perjury. See note 19, infra.
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"something metallic" in Love's
hand, and that "If I don't say I saw a
gun I'm dead." Whiteside's attorney
warned him that if he so testified, he
would advise the court of the defendant's proposed perjury, seek to
withdraw from the case, and attempt to impeach his client's
testimony. Whiteside testified,
stating that he "knew" Love had a
gun but had not actually seen a gun
in Love's hand. After the jury
returned a murder verdict,
Whiteside moved for a new trial,
contending that his lawyer's admonition not to state that he saw
"something metallic" denied him a
fair trial. After a hearing, the trial
court denied the motion and the
Iowa Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that an attorney's duty to
his client does not extend to
assisting the commission of perjury.
Whiteside then petitioned the
federal district court for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that his
counsel's actions denied him effective assistance of counsel and the
right to present his defense. The
district court denied the writ but the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed.1 3 The court found that
although a criminal defendant's
privilege to testify does not include
a right to commit perjury, counsel's
admonition that he would inform
the court of the planned perjury
constituted a threat to violate an attorney's duty to preserve client confidences and as such, breached the
standards of effective representation
laid down in Strickland v.
Washington. 14
The Supreme Court reversed,
and reinstated the conviction. Every
Justice agreed that Whiteside had
not been denied effective representation under the Strickland test, which
requires a defendant to show that
counsel committed such serious professional errors as to undermine
confidence in the outcome of the
trialY An attorney's duty to his
client, five Justices wrote for the majority, is limited to legitimate conduct, and does not include assisting

32

his client in presenting false
evidence.
Although not required to, the
majority discussed what it believed
were appropriate ethical responses
for lawyers faced with client perjury. The attorney initially should
attempt to dissuade his client from
his unlawful plan. 16 If that course is
unsuccessful, the attorneY is
obligated to reveal his client's con-

duct to the court, 17 and even seek to
withdraw from the case. 18 Under no
circumstances, the majority emphasized, should the lawyer either
assist, or even passively permit, his
client giving false testimony.19
Moreover, counsel's threat to reveal
Whiteside's perjury and withdraw

13 Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir.
1984).

14

466 U.S. 668 (1984).

466 U.S. at 667-668. The Court in
Strickland emphasized that a claim of ineffectiveness has two components. First, a defendant must show that counsel's performance
was "deficient" in that he "made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as
the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment." Second, the defendant
must show that he was prejudiced, in that
"counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendallt of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable."
15

16 "It is universally agreed that at a minimum
the attorney's first duty when confronted

with a proposal for perjurious testimony is to
attempt to dissuade the client from the
unlawful course of conduct." 106 S. Ct. at
996. See ABA Informal Opiniori 1314 (1975);
ABA MODEL RULE 3.3, Comment (1983).
17 The Court stated: "Indeed, both the Model
Code and the Model Rules do not merely
authorize disclosure by counsel of client perjury, they require such disclosure," 106 S. Ct.
at 995 (emphasis in original). This is not
altogether correct. The Model Rules appear
to require disclosure only after the client has
given false testimony. See ABA MODEL
RULE 3.3, Comment (1983). Moreover, the
Model Code appears to allow, but does not
require, an attorney to reveal his client's intention to commit perjury. See ABA MODEL
CODE, DR 4-101(C)(3). Nor is the Court's
reliance on DR 7-102(B)(1) correct, since that
provision concerns a lawyer's obligation
when faced with a client who has already
committed perjury. The courts are equally
unclear. Compare State v. Henderson, 468
P.2d 136 (Kan. 1970); State v. Robinson, 224
S.E.2d 174 (N.C. 1976); People v. Salquerro,
433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1980), with United States
ex reI. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d
Cir. 1977); Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d
844 (D.C. App. 1980). Moreover, disclosure
may impinge on the attorney-client confidential relationship, see ABA MODEL CODE
DR 4-101, as well as the defendant's right to a
fair trial. United States ex reI. Wilcox v.
Johnson, supra.
18 ABA Informal Opinion 1314 (1975); ABA
MODEL RULE 3.3, Comment (1983). Several
courts require the attorney to withdraw upon
learning of a client's intention to commit perjury. See Newcomb v. State, 651 P.2d 1176
(Alaska App. 1982); In re Palmer, 252 S.E.2d
784 (N.C. 1979); People v. Blye, 223 Cal.
App. 2d 143, 43 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1965). A
withdrawal motion probably will be denied if
counsel refuses to disclose to the court the
basis for the motion. See United States v.
Henkel, 799 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1986); People
v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1981); People
v. Salquerro, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1980). See
also Erickson, The Perjurious Defendant: A
Proposed Solution to the Defense Lawyer's
Conflicting Obligation to the Court and His
Client, 59 Den. L. J. 75 (1981).
19 Prior to Whiteside, the approach most
widely accepted by the courts was the free
narrative, whereby an attorney who believed
that his client would testify falsely would first
inform the court that he advised his client not
to testify, and then remain mute while the
defendant gave his testimony, without conducting any examination, or arguing the
testimony to the jury. See Burger, Standards
of Conduct: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 Am.
Crim. L. Q. 11, 13 (1966); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 4-7.7
(2d Ed. 1980). See also United States v.
Campbell, 616 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir. 1980);
Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.
1978); Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844
(D.C. App. 1980); Sanborn v. State, 474
So.2d 309 (Fla. App. 1985); State v. Fosnight,
679 P.2d 174 (Kan. 1984); In re Goodwin, 305
S.E.2d 578 (S.c. '1983); People v. Salquerro,
433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1980).
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from
the
case
were
indistinguishable, according to the
majority, from disclosing client
misconduct such as tampering with
witnesses or jurors. 20 "In short, the
responsibility of an ethical lawyer,
as an officer of the court and a key
component of a system of justice,
dedicated to a search for truth, is
essentially the same whether the
client announces an intention to
bribe or threaten witnesses or jurors
or to commit or procure perjury. No
system of justice worthy of the
name can tolerate a lesser
standard. "21
Four Justices concurred in the
result, but would have limited their
consideration to the constitutional
questions involved, and resisted the
invitation to enter this "thorny" and
"controversial" area, and formulate
rigid rules of professional conduct
for attorneys. Under the Strickland
test, however, since Whiteside had
no constitutional right to his
counsel's assistance in committing
perjury, nor counsel's silence about
the plan, no violation occurred.
That is not to say, emphasized the
concurring Justices, that a Sixth
Amendment violation could not be
shown in other related circumstances. This might depend on
the level of the attorney's certainty
about the proposed perjury; the
stage of the proceedings at which
the attorney discovers the plan; or
the methods used by the attorney to
try to dissuade his client. The concurring Justices cautioned, however,
that attorneys who adopt "the role
of the judge or jury to determine the
facts pose a danger of depriving
their clients of the zealous and loyal
advocacy required by the Sixth
Amendment. "22
Nix is a troubling decision. As a
jurisprudential matter, the case is a
peculiar blend of constitutional doctrine and legal morals. The holding
is fairly narrow; the dicta is extremely broad. Essentially the Court
emphasized, as it has on many
previous occasions, that perjury is
obnoxious to the justice system,23

and announced for the first time
that a lawyer's refusal to cooperate
in his client's plan to lie does not
under the circumstances render the
lawyer ineffective under the Sixth
Amendment. This was predictable.
Wholly unpredictable, however,
was the Court's willingness to enter
the ethical twilight zone of attorneyclient interaction, and promulgate a
code of attorney behavior in the
context of client perjury.
Several points are notable. First,
this excursion into defense lawyer
ethics stands in sharp contrast to the
Court's historic unwillingness to impose ethical rules for prosecutors or
other government officials. The
Court recently wrote: "Nothing in
the Constitution vests in us the
authority to mandate a code of
behavior for state officials. "24
Similarly, the Court observed: 'The
Due Process Clause is not a code of
ethics for prosecutors. "25 And in one
recent case in which a prosecutor
engaged in outrageous misconduct,26
the Court, after issuing a few
paragraphs of mild reproach, concluded: "[Defendant's} trial was not
perfect - few are --'- but neither was
it fundamentally unfair ."27 In that
case - Darden v. Wainwright the prosecutor characterized the
defendant as an "animal;" told the
jury that the only guarantee against
his future crimes would be to execute him; that he should have "a
leash on him;" and should have "his
face blown away by a shotgun." It
became the function of the four
dissenting Justices to outline painfully the numerous ethical rules
which the prosecutor violated. And
ironically, in cases involving prosecutorial subornation of perjury
and suppression of evidence, the
Court has carefully avoided ethical
condemnations, stating: "Nor do we
believe the constitutional obligation
is measured by the moral culpability, or willfulness, of the prosecutor. "28 Unevenhanded ethical
jurisprudence promotes cynicism
and disrespect, and can even encourage further government mis-
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conduct. 29 Aggravating the concerns
over such disparate treatment, of
course, is the overriding legal and
ethical precept that it is the prosecutor's obligation, rather than
that of defense counsel, "not that it
shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done."30
Moreover, Nix v. Whiteside, as
with other decisions involving the
role of counsel for indigent defendants, continues a trend which
threatens to undermine the fierce
and dedicated representation to
which such defendants are constitutionally entitled. Just as it is virtually inconceivable, for example, that a
privately retained lawyer would
ever file on appeal an "Anders brief"
alleging no meritorious issue,31 it is
equally inconceivable that a privately retained lawyer would threaten to
impeach his client's proposed
testimony, or report his conduct to
the judge. It is hardly surprising that
virtually all of the decisions dealing

20 Preventing a client from tampering with
witnesses or jurors arguably stands on an entirely different footing than threatening to expose a client's own false testimony.
Testimony by a defendant is inextricably connected with constitutional considerations; no
such considerations apply to the corruption
of witnesses or jurors.
21 106 S. Ct. at 998.
22 106 S. Ct. at 1006.
23 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (197l);
Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969;
United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969);
United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937).

24 Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1143
(1986).

25 Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 511
(1986).

26 Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464
(1986).
Id. at 2473.

27

28 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110
(1976).

See Gershman, Why Prosecutors
Misbehave, 22 Crim. L. Bull. 131 (1986).

29

30 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935).

31 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
See also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983)
(indigent defendant has no constitutional
right to compel appointed counsel to argue
on appeal all nonfrivolous points).
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with client perjury involve attorneys who are either public
defenders, or court appointed. This
is not to suggest that a poor defendant has any greater right to commit
perjury than a wealthy one, or that
retained lawyers necessarily would
tolerate client perjury more readily
than lawyers paid by the state. 32 Nor
is it altogether clear that public
defenders view the issue of client
perjury differently than retained
counsel. However, any attorney
who feels that he has to justify to the
court the correctness or effectiveness of his representation, or is
inclined to play the role of jury or
judge, may, as the concurring opinion in Nix warned, deprive his client
of the zealous advocacy guaranteed
by the Constitution.
Finally, to the extent that Nix
authorizes defense counsel to engage
in conduct which effectively drives
his client off the witness stand, it
constitutes an insensitive and unwarranted intrusion into a defendant's right to testify in his own
behalf. 33 Crucial to notions of
civilized justice are concerns for a
defendant's individual freedom and
dignity. Such concerns ought to be
respected, even at the risk of false
testimony.34 Surely the abolition of
common law rules of witness disqualification did not imply that
defendants thereafter would give
only truthful testimony. Thus,
shocking as it may seem to some, a
defendant probably should be
allowed to lie, even though he has
no right to lie. The jury, not defense
counsel, should be the safeguard
against perjury. As Justices Brennan
and Marshall observed: "The role of
the defense lawyer should be above
all to function as the instrument and
defender of the client's autonomy
and dignity in all phases of the
criminal process."35 To be sure, a
lawyer should not cooperate in his
client's perjury, assist him in any
manner, or use such testimony in
argument to the jury. This is a far
cry, however, from the conduct of
the lawyer in Nix. He was function-

ing not as a defense counsel, but as a
surrogate prosecutor. Simultaneous
commitments to one's client, and to
the cause of abstract justice, are incompatible. To the extent that bar
codes and court decisions mandate
such behavior, they demand from
attorneys the impossible. If the
defendant wishes to lie, the lawyer
should sit back and let his client say
what he wants to say. From a tactical standpoint, this may be the
worst possible scenario for a defendant. But that is his choice. 36 Nothing
in Nix v. Whiteside prevents state
bar associations from enacting
ethical rules consistent with this approach. 37
32 To be sure, privately retained counsel may
raise the issue from a sincere belief in the
ethical considerations. On the other hand,
such counsel may raise the issue for tactical
reasons, such as seeking a continuance, or
engineering a mistrial. See, e.g., Lowery v.
Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 731 n. 6 (9th Cir.
1978); McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d
754 (5th Cir, 1967), aff'd after remand, 398
F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968).
33 See note 11, supra,

34 G. HAZARD, note 1 supra at 127-135.
35 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 763 (1983).
Arguably, a lawyer standing mute and
refraining from direct or redirect examination, and then failing to support the defendant's testimony in closing argument, conveys
to the jury a pretty clear signal as to defense
counsel's view of 'the evidence.
37 The Court stated: "When examining attorney conduct, a court must be careful not
to narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct and thereby intrude into the State's proper authority to
define and apply the standards of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to
practice in its courts." 106 S. Ct. at 994.
Justice Brennan similarly observed: "[Tlhe
Court cannot tell the states or the lawyers in
the states how to behave in their courts,
unless or until federal rights are violated." [d,
at 1000 (concurring opinion) (emphasis in
original).
Thus far, eleven states have adopted the
ABA Model Rules. New York continues to
follow the ABA Model Code. On November
2, 1985, the House of Delegates of the New
York State Bar Association rejected a resolution to recommend an amended version of
the Model Rules.
36

.......
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